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I. INTRODUCTION  
John Braithwaite’s seminal work on responsive regulation1 has been 
taken up and developed by tax authorities around the world.2 It has had 
a major impact on methods of tax administration. The Braithwaite 
model, with its enforcement strategy and regulatory sanctions pyramid3
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, 
has much to offer in a tax context. This strategy works by relying on 
self-regulation or attempting to coax compliance by persuasion initially, 
which will work with the majority, and then moving on to greater levels 
of enforcement culminating in criminal penalties for the most 
1  Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Braithwaite, 
“The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev [forthcoming] 
[Braithwaite, “Essence”]. See also John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in 
Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) [Braithwaite, Markets]; Valerie 
Braithwaite, ed, Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) [Braithwaite, Democracy] (applying these ideas in tax 
writings). 
2  Kristina Murphy, “Moving Forward Towards a More Effective Model of 
Regulatory Enforcement in the Australian Tax Office” [2004] British Tax Review 
603. 
3  This was introduced in John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of 
Coal Mine Safety (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) and then 
developed in Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
recalcitrant minority at the tip of the pyramid.4
Some critics argue that there is an inherent constitutional problem 
with responsive regulation.
 This approach has some 
limitations and difficulties, however, and its application in the tax world 
could be strengthened by recognition of its weaknesses and the 
implementation of action to address these problems.  
5 These concerns are of a general nature, but 
have particular strength in the tax field, in view of the constitutional and 
political sensitivity surrounding tax raising powers and as a result of the 
complexity and relative indeterminacy of tax law, which may make it 
more difficult than in other areas to assess what constitutes compliance 
in every case.6
                                                     
4  See especially Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 
35–40. 
 To some extent the limitations relate to the way in which 
the model is applied, but there are also more fundamental objections 
that require examination. This article discusses two particular problems, 
together with possible responses, which could help to appease the 
critics of responsive regulation in the tax arena. Part II describes these 
problems and sets out the challenges posed by responsive regulation to 
tax administration. Part III discusses these issues further, in the context 
of changing relationships between revenue authorities and large 
businesses, using a case study based on the approach of Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the U.K. in this area. Part IV 
discusses the issues raised by the example in the context of some of the 
responsive regulation literature and Part V concludes by suggesting that 
the theory of responsive regulation has great value in tax administration 
but also the potential for misfiring in this area unless applied and used 
only where appropriate legal safeguards are provided. Legally 
enforceable safeguards are required to maintain the rule of law and 
provide a clear framework of objectives, due to the sensitivity of 
taxation and the complex relationship between citizen and taxpayer. 
5  See e.g. Jan Freigang, “Scrutiny: Is Responsive Regulation Compatible with the 
Rule of Law?” (2002) 8:4 European Public Law 463; Karen Yeung, Securing 
compliance: a principled approach (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 170, 248.  
6  See Mark Burton, “Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of Tax Law: Time to 
Reconsider the Commissioner’s Model of Cooperative Compliance?” (2007) 5:1 
eJournal of Tax Research 71. Critics have made similar comments in connection 
with other areas of law, however, for example criminal law. See Andrew Ashworth, 
“Is the criminal law a lost cause?” (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225. 
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The phrase “rule of law” is used here in its formal rather than its 
substantive sense to mean that government should govern by known 
rules and that the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its 
subjects.7
An adherence to the rule of law does not mean that we must stick to 
the old cat-and-mouse game of detailed legislation, which often 
provides opportunities for taxpayers and their advisers to find ways of 
subverting that very legislation—the game of “creative compliance”.
 This is not inconsistent with a theoretical approach that rests 
upon mutual trust but can provide an appropriate background for a 
relationship of trust.  
8 
The answer does not lie in rigid detailed legislation, literally 
interpreted; indeed, this is not the way most modern legal systems 
work, even in the tax area. It may be essential to leave some discretion 
in the hands of the tax authorities and the courts, but this must be 
bounded discretion. Building trust and involving interest groups in 
“regulatory conversations”9 are important parts of the answer, but in a 
tax context this must be supported by legal structures and be subject to 
administrative safeguards or it will not be perceived by taxpayers to be 
fair, in which case responsive regulation will fail.10
If tax law cannot be certain (and it is unlikely that it can be) then it 
must at least be ascertainable within an equitable system.
 
11
                                                     
7  See Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(London: Macmillan, 1885); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2009) at ch 11. See also Paul 
Craig, “Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: an analytical 
framework” [1997] PL 467 (for further discussion and references). 
 This may be 
better achieved through a system based on principles than on one 
8  See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, “The elusive spirit of the law: 
formalism and the struggle for legal control” (1991) 54:6 Mod L Rev 848. 
9  Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) [Black, Rules]. 
See also John Braithwaite, “Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty” 
(2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 [Braithwaite, “Legal 
Certainty”] (developing the term in a tax context).  
10  Valerie Braithwaite, “Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and 
Non-complaint Actions” in Braithwaite, Democracy, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined. [Braithwaite, “Dancing”] at 15. 
11  Timothy AO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) at 176. 
attempting the futile aim of achieving comprehensive rules.12
II. TAX AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION: APPLICATION AND 
CHALLENGES 
 The use 
of some discretion will always be necessary; the consequences for 
taxpayers who disagree with interpretations and applications made by 
revenue authorities need to be as limited as possible, transparent, and 
open to scrutiny and challenge.  
As would be expected by those familiar with the general theory of 
responsive regulation, the compliance pyramid as applied in a tax 
context seeks to select an enforcement strategy that reflects the 
behaviour of the taxpayer.13 As applied to the tax area, the enforcement 
pyramid works on the basis that most taxpayers voluntarily comply 
with the tax system. Many more can be regulated by way of persuasion 
in the context of co-operation and trust, for example by the authorities 
giving advice where a taxpayer is confused, rather than instantly 
charging a penalty.14
It is likely, however, that some taxpayers within this middle space 
consider themselves entitled to take advantage of ‘grey’ areas in the law 
and believe themselves to be compliant already, within their own 
definition of the law, even though they may be aware that their view is 
contentious. Given the indeterminacy of some tax law, it may even be 
that the taxpayer’s view of the effect of a particular law is as likely to 
be upheld by the courts as that of the revenue authority’s view.  
 These compliant taxpayers form the majority, at 
the base of the pyramid. The taxpayers at the tip of the pyramid are 
those who are engaged in tax evasion and they must be dealt with by 
way of deterrence and penalties. The middle space is occupied largely 
by taxpayers who wish to be broadly compliant, but who might need 
more help or persuasion to comply.  
                                                     
12  Braithwaite, “Legal Certainty”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Judith 
Freedman “Improving (Not Perfecting) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles 
Revisited” [2010] British Tax Review 717 [Freedman, “Improving”]. 
13  See Australian Government: Australian Taxation Office, Introduction to the 
Compliance Model, online: <http://www.ato.gov.au>.  
14  See Murphy, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (for further examples). 
See also Part III of this article, which discusses methods used to encourage business 
taxpayers to refrain for exploiting all possible tax avoidance opportunities that they 
feel might be open to them.  
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In most systems of tax law, and certainly in the U.K. and in Canada, 
there is a line between evasion on the one hand (involving fraud or at 
least non-disclosure and thus illegal), and avoidance on the other. 
Avoidance does not depend on hiding the activity concerned, but relies 
upon a particular reading of the tax legislation and may often involve 
steps inserted for tax purposes rather than commercial reasons. At one 
end of this avoidance spectrum there will be aggressive, artificial or 
what the Canadian courts have termed “abusive” avoidance. Sometimes 
these abusive forms of avoidance are prevented from working by a 
general anti-avoidance statutory provision (GAAR, in Canada15) or the 
application of judicially developed principles (as in the U.S.16 and, 
possibly, the U.K.17). At the other end of the spectrum is tax planning or 
mitigation, which may be entered into for overall commercial reasons 
but may have elements which are designed to save tax. In most 
jurisdictions there will be occasions on which this will work to achieve 
the tax minimization sought technically and in the determination of the 
courts.18
                                                     
15  Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (as amended) s 245. 
 The revenue authorities and tax payer may have different ideas 
about where the line should be drawn within this spectrum and without 
litigation there may be reasonably held differing views as to which 
16  The USA now has a mixture of judicial doctrines developed since the initial 
decision in Gregory v Helvering, 293 US 465 (1935) and statutory codification of 
the economic substance doctrine introduced by The Healthcare and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-152,124 Stat 1029, inserting § 7701(o) 
into Internal Revenue Code, USC tit 26. See IRS, Codification of Economic 
Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (14 September 2010), online: 
<http://www.irs.gov>. 
17  The U.K. appeared to have developed a judicial doctrine in the case of WT Ramsay 
Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300, but the position has been unclear since the decision in 
Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson [2004] UKHL 51, [2005] 1 
AC 684 [BMBF]. See also Judith Freedman “Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax 
Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament” [122] Law Quarterly Review 52 
[Freedman, “Interpreting Tax”]. 
18  See e.g. Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 
SCR 601 at paras 44–62 ("Unless the Minister can establish that the avoidance 
transaction frustrates or defeats the purpose for which the tax benefit was intended 
to be conferred, it is not abusive"). See also David G Duff & Harry Erlichman, eds, 
Tax Avoidance in Canada After Canada Trustco and Mathew (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2007) (for the Canadian position); supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (for 
the U.K. position).  
party is correct. The line between tax planning which the courts will 
hold to be effective and abusive tax avoidance which the courts will 
thwart is sometimes extremely unclear. It is this area which is referred 
to in this article as the “grey” area.  
The revenue authorities not only have a problem with the group of 
deliberate evaders at the tip of the pyramid, who represent a major 
leakage or revenue, but they are also concerned about those taxpayers 
willing to utilize, and even insisting on their right to utilize, schemes to 
minimize taxation which fall into the grey area. The latter group of 
taxpayer is seen by the authorities (and others) as posing a threat to the 
collection of revenue that had been anticipated by the revenue authority 
on the basis of the authority’s interpretation of the law.19 This group of 
taxpayers, however, seeing itself as fully compliant, may be resistant to 
“persuasion”20 since they will consider that they are being open and 
transparent and satisfying their legal obligations.21
Arising from this situation of the grey area taxpayers, the first 
problem discussed here relates to the extent to which persuasion is a 
legitimate device for seeking to control behaviour that is not universally 
accepted to be non-compliant, because there is more than one arguable 
view. This indeterminacy is not a problem unique to tax
 
22
                                                     
19  See HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Measuring Tax Gaps 2010 (16 September 
2010) at s 1.1, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> [HRMC, Measuring] (defining 
the tax gap as the “tax that would be paid if all individuals and companies complied 
with both the letter of the law and HMRC’s interpretation of the intention of 
Parliament in setting law (referred to as the spirit of the law)”). 
 but is found 
frequently in areas of financial complexity where the law mirrors the 
complications of the underlying commercial arrangements. A great deal 
of effort may be expended in finding sophisticated ways of keeping to 
the strict legal position whilst achieving the objectives of those 
concerned in these situations. As John Braithwaite has pointed out, 
20  On the meaning of “persuasion” throughout the article, see supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined..  
21  Although in some jurisdictions, in some situations, they may suffer a penalty if they 
litigate and lose. See e.g. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, "The Case Against a Strict 
Liability Economic Substance Penalty" (2011) 13 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law. 
22  Doreen McBarnet, “When Compliance is not the Solution but the Problem: From 
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude” in Braithwaite, Democracy, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined. at 229.  
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large public corporations in the public eye are good examples of 
taxpayers who usually will want to be fully compliant with the law as 
they and their advisers interpret it to be, whilst often seeking tenable tax 
schemes to minimize their taxes. He shows that this makes the pattern 
of large business compliance egg-shaped rather than pyramidal, with 
large numbers of corporate taxpayers falling into the grey area of tax 
avoidance. John Braithwaite admits that the approach to such firms has 
to be different from that taken with small businesses and individuals 
because “it is hard to make compliance strategies work when 
compliance behaviour is egg-shaped”. 23 He agrees that law reform is 
the first “circuit-breaker” needed to push those in the grey middle bulge 
down into the base of the egg, but he argues that the building of 
cooperative relationships is also necessary and will increase compliance 
at a reduced cost.24
The difficulty is that, as explained above, the complexity in an area 
such as corporate taxation makes it hard to say that some behaviour in 
the grey areas is non-compliant, and views differ on the acceptability of 
such behaviour.
  
25 Reasonable onlookers and the authorities might draw 
the line between unacceptable avoidance and “acceptable” tax planning 
in different places, depending on their views of the role of taxation, the 
fact situation in each case and even the amount of revenue at stake.26
                                                     
23  John Braithwaite, “Large Business and the Compliance Model” in Braithwaite, 
Democracy, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 177 [Braithwaite, “Large 
Business”] at 178 at 178–181.  
 
24  Ibid at 195.  
25  Ibid; Burton, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; McBarnet & Whelan, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Judith Freedman, “Defining Taxpayer 
Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle” [2004] British 
Tax Review 332 [Freedman, “Anti-Avoidance”]; Sol Picciotto “Constructing 
Compliance: Game-Playing, Tax Law and the Regulatory State” (2007) 29:1 Law 
and Pol’y 11.  
26  In fact the grey area is not uniform, but has to be seen as having various shades or 
gradations: see Judith Freedman, Geoffrey Loomer & John Vella, “Analyzing The 
Enhanced Relationship Between Corporate Taxpayers and Revenue Authorities: A 
U.K. Case Study” in James Dalton & Martha Eller Gangi, eds, Recent Research on 
Tax Administration and Compliance: Selected Papers Given at the IRS 2009 
Research Conference, online: Internal Revenue Service <http://www.irs.gov> 103 
at 119, 125–126.  
This can make it difficult to say when persuasion to behave in certain 
way which is not clearly non-compliant is appropriate.  
To most lawyers, the answer is that the courts must decide where 
that line should be drawn by determining the proper meaning of the 
law.27 On this view, taxpayers in the grey area move into the bottom of 
the pyramid if the behaviour they have undertaken is held by the courts 
to be in accordance with a proper interpretation of the law. Only the 
courts can give that interpretation.28 Until the issue has come to court, 
however, different views may be taken on the proper interpretation of 
legislation. It has been suggested that it may suit the revenue authority 
at times for matters not to be heard by the judges in case the courts 
decide against the authority’s view of what the law should be.29
Some would argue that the courts at times do not go far enough to 
construe the legislation in accordance with the intent of the legislature 
or what these critics would argue is the “spirit of the law”. It is the task 
of the courts to find the intention of the legislature, primarily by 
reference to the wording of the statute. In some jurisdictions there will 
be more scope for purposive interpretation by the courts than in others. 
Some jurisdictions, but not others, may permit courts to look at 
background papers. Every tax system, however, imposes some limits on 
the extent to which courts can interpret legislation in such a way as to 
close gaps left by the wording of the statute. If by “spirit of the law” is 
meant simply the proper intention of the legislature as discovered by the 
application of permissible purposive construction, then of course the 
  
                                                     
27  That is, in accordance with the formal conception of the rule of law described in 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
28  Lord Hoffmann, “Tax Avoidance” [2005] British Tax Review 197. See also 
Freedman, “Interpreting Tax”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(particularly the literature on statutory interpretation discussed at Error! 
Bookmark not defined.–Error! Bookmark not defined. and further in this article 
below);HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), Summary of Responses: A Code of 
Practice for Taxation on Banks (London: HMRC, 2009), online: 
<http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk> (for the carefully worded but still controversial 
discussion of this issue).  
29  McBarnet, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 237 (in the context of 
both the Financial Reporting Review Panel and the U.K. Inland Revenue, as it then 
was). See also David M Fogel, “The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals 
Division” (2 June 2003) 99 Tax Notes 1503 cited in Joshua D Blank, “In Defense of 
Tax Privacy” 61 Emory LJ [forthcoming in 2011] at 35, n202.  
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courts should be finding the spirit of the law and the taxpayer should be 
abiding by this.30 But others suggest that the spirit of the law may be 
found outside the decision of the courts, in terms of what is acceptable 
to the revenue authorities or current government, or perhaps even non-
governmental organizations.31 This means that there may be a gap 
between the quite proper interpretation given by the courts (based on 
the limitations of the system, on language and on the legislative 
process) and the view of the current revenue authorities on the meaning 
and intent of the law.32
                                                     
30  See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (25 May 2011), online <http://www 
.oecd.org> at ch 11 (“Complying with the spirit of the law means discerning and 
following the intention of the legislature. It does not require an enterprise to make 
payment in excess of the amount legally required pursuant to such an 
interpretation” although the commentary goes further and states that “An enterprise 
complies with the spirit of the tax laws and regulations if it takes reasonable steps 
to determine the intention of the legislature and interprets those tax rules consistent 
with that intention in light of the statutory language and relevant, contemporaneous 
legislative history”. It is not necessarily the case that the law of the jurisdiction 
permits consideration of the latter factor.) 
 
31  See HMRC, Measuring, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. See also 
ActionAid, Calling Time: Why SABMiller should stop dodging taxes in Africa 
(London: ActionAid 2010) at  7 (“Tax avoidance activities are designed to comply 
with the letter of the law, not to break it as in the case of tax evasion. We use the 
term to cover strategies that are legally permissible, but which ActionAid regards as 
ethically questionable. Throughout this report, we use the terms ‘tax dodging’ and 
‘tax avoidance’ interchangeably.”).  
32  See Hoffmann, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (the “only way in which 
Parliament can express an intention to impose a tax is by a statute that means such a 
tax is to be imposed”). On this view, if the wording of the statute as interpreted by 
the courts does not successfully impose the tax then it cannot have been the 
intention of parliament to do so.” The intention of parliament in this sense must be 
distinguished from the intention of the government, or their advisers, or individual 
members of the government, who might have felt very differently, or would have 
felt differently had they thought about it. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at ch 6, taking issue with 
Andrei Marmor’s Interpretation and Legal Theory, 2d ed (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005). See also HMRC v Mayes [2011] EWCA Civ 407, [2011] STC 1269. In this 
case relating to a complex and highly artificial tax avoidance scheme, the Court of 
Appeal reluctantly found for the taxpayers. The legislation did not provide any 
underlying or overriding purpose that enabled the courts to apply a purposive 
interpretation to reach the result that they felt instinctively would have been correct. 
Lord Justice Thomas and Lord Justice Toulson both commented that this was a 
 
 
It is notable that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (The 
Intermediaries Study)33 defines the aggressive tax planning that it seeks 
to control as including “[p]lanning involving a tax position that is 
tenable but has unintended and unexpected tax revenue consequences. 
Revenue bodies’ concerns relate to the risk that tax legislation can be 
misused to achieve results which were not foreseen by the 
legislators.”34
The OECD’s study is careful to talk about the intention of the 
legislators and describes this behaviour as misuse. The intentions of the 
legislators are not, however, always crystal clear. Taking a position that 
is tenable, even if the tax authorities do not like it, might not necessarily 
be misuse. Sometimes the tax authorities and the commentators slip 
into equating the intention of the legislators with that of the tax 
authorities. Thus, John Braithwaite himself refers to the “many who do 
not intend to comply with what the [Australian Tax Office] regards as 
the policy purposes of the parliament’s laws”.
 
35
If it is accepted, however, that ultimately the question of the proper 
interpretation of the intention of the legislature must be a question for 
the courts, then the issue must be whether the legislature is adequately 
conveying its intention to the courts and whether the courts are 
interpreting legislation competently. Moreover, unless a purely legal 
analysis is utilized to draw the line between what is tax avoidance and 
what is not, the question arises: where else could the required standard 
of behaviour possibly come from? Who should adjudicate between the 
interpretation of the tax authorities and that of the taxpayer on the true 
meaning of legislation if it is not the courts?  
 
The question of who decides the meaning of avoidance is discussed 
further below. The first problem discussed in this article, however, 
                                                                                                                
result that parliament could not have foreseen or intended, but by this they meant 
that they could not look at “intention of parliament” in the wider sense but could 
only look at the wording of the statute. .                                                                                                                     
33  OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (np: OECD, 2008), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org> [OECD, Intermediaries].  
34  Ibid at 10 [emphasis added].  
35  Braithwaite, “Large Business”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 179.  
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addresses the discretionary scope tax officers have where treatment of a 
taxpayer, before and until a contentious issue reaches the courts, is 
concerned. . Given that it is generally considered necessary in order to 
satisfy the requirements of the rule of law36
The use of persuasion to encourage compliance beyond that which 
might be required by law could result in unequal or disproportionate 
burdens on taxpayers who are not actually disobeying the law. Further, 
giving tax officials too much power to decide when to pursue a matter 
and when to apply a light touch, or even to settle with a taxpayer, could 
lead to an incentive for corporate managers to attempt to exercise 
influence over tax officers. There might even be a temptation towards 
corruption or at least regulatory capture resulting from “large 
unchecked power”, as has been argued by Grbich in an Australian 
context.
 for taxes to be imposed 
clearly by their legislatures and not by administrators, to what extent 
under responsive regulation regimes can revenue authorities pay more 
attention to taxpayers who are working within the limits of the law as 
they believe it to be but who are applying an interpretation that the 
revenue authorities find questionable, or perhaps even one they 
reluctantly agree with but the result of which they dislike?  
37 If some taxpayers are dealt with by using a “light touch” 
because they are trusted, others might complain that the same 
advantages are not available to them, perhaps because a scheme that is 
available to one sector of the population is not available to all.38
                                                     
36  See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 
37  Yuri Grbich, “After Bellinz and Ralph: A New Focus for Decision-Making in the 
Australian Tax System” in Michael Walpole & Christopher Evans, eds, Tax 
Administration in the 21st Century (Sydney: Prospect Media, 2001), cited in 
Braithwaite, Markets, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (this is not a 
suggestion that any corruption has actually taken place, either in the U.K. or 
elsewhere. Grbich was making the point that tax officials might develop a desire to 
please those whom they are supposed to be regulating under responsive regulation). 
See also Burton, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 102. Most 
jurisdictions will have administrative mechanisms to review this exercise of power 
internally within the revenue organization itself and by giving powers to external 
review bodies—for example the National Audit Office in the U.K. and the Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration in the U.S.; nevertheless a situation is set 
up where a large degree of discretion is given to individuals.  
38  See e.g. Part III, below, especially infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (for 
the discussion of the enhanced relationship between the U.K. revenue authority and 
large businesses).  
Collectively these issues will be referred to in this article as the “rule of 
law” problem. 
The second problem highlighted in this article is the relationship 
between responsive regulation and risk management. For tax authorities 
that are short of resources, an attraction of the compliance pyramid is 
that it offers less intensive approaches to administration for those 
voluntarily compliant taxpayers located at the base, allowing more 
concentration of resources higher up the pyramid where they can make 
a real difference. It is clearly reasonable to have some system of 
resource allocation, since no system has unlimited resources. Assigning 
to taxpayers a level of risk related to their behaviour and their own 
governance mechanisms, assists in placing them on the compliance 
pyramid,39 but a mechanistic risk rating process will be far from 
responsive and tax authorities should not equate the two approaches. 
Past behaviour may not be a guide to future actions; resource allocation 
based on such a backward-looking risk rating could mean that problems 
are not anticipated and that improved behaviour is not rewarded quickly 
enough to have an impact.40
This second problem is compounded when combined with the 
existence of the grey area discussed above. A high risk rating based on 
behaviour that the taxpayer considers acceptable, though the tax 
authority does not, could lead to a negative reaction from the taxpayer. 
It might actually reduce co-operation in other areas of this taxpayer’s 
tax administration, since this would not be seen to lead to any benefits, 
even though the taxpayer might be ready to be transparent and open 
about what it is doing. It could push the taxpayer further from the 
behaviour required rather than closer. For these reasons it is not clear 
that risk rating for the purposes of resource allocation is necessarily 
always consistent with the use of responsive regulation, although 
superficially it appears to fit well. This will be referred to in this article 
as the “mixed objectives” problem. The “rule of law” and “mixed 
objectives” problems described above are discussed further in Part III.  
  
                                                     
39  John Braithwaite, “Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulation for Tax 
System Integrity” (2003) 25:1 Law and Pol’y 1. 
40  See Julia Black, “The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public 
Risk Management in the United Kingdom” [2005] PL 512 [Black, “Emergence”]; 
Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (2008) 71:1 Mod L 
Rev 59.  
2011 RESPONSIVE REGULATION, RISK, AND RULES 13 
 
III. RESPONSIVE REGULATION AND ENHANCED  
CO-OPERATION WITH LARGE BUSINESS 
A. SPREAD OF THE MODEL AND APPLICATION TO LARGE BUSINESS 
TAXPAYERS 
Tax officials around the world who have never read an academic article, 
or even heard of John Braithwaite, are familiar with the regulatory 
pyramid and compliance model developed by his team. A pyramidal 
model of responsive regulation was introduced into the Australian Tax 
Office (ATO) in 1998, based on the work of Braithwaite’s Centre for 
Tax System Integrity (CTSI).41
The OECD has helped to spread this concept. Taking large business 
taxpayers as a case study we can note the impact of the Intermediaries 
Study.
 Through this medium and by adoption 
in a number of jurisdictions, these ideas are being introduced more 
widely.  
42 This focused on large corporate taxpayers as those supplying 
much of the demand for aggressive tax avoidance schemes,43 which are 
provided by professional and other intermediaries. The Intermediaries 
Study develops a conceptual framework for an enhanced relationship 
between large corporate taxpayers and tax administrations as a way of 
tackling what it perceives to be increasing aggressive tax avoidance. 
This requires a collaborative, trust-based relationship between revenue 
bodies and large corporate taxpayers and may require both sides to go 
beyond statutory obligations. The framework was informed by the 
experiences of jurisdictions which have already established such co-
operative relationships such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and the U.S.44
To explain the concept with an example, perhaps the most developed 
and most co-operative model of this relationship is to be found in the 
  
                                                     
41  Murphy, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
42  OECD, Intermediaries, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. See also 
OECD, OECD Tax Intermediaries Study: Working Paper 5: Risk Management (np: 
OECD, 2007), online: <http://www.oecd.org>. See also EC, Fiscalis Risk 
Management Platform Group, Compliance Risk Management Guide for Tax 
Administrations (2010), online: <http://ec.europa.eu>. 
43  See OECD, Intermediaries, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 10–11 
(for the OECD definition of aggressive tax planning).  
44  Ibid at Annex 8.1. 
Netherlands. It has been noted that it builds on a long tradition in the 
Netherlands of a consensus or “polder” model45 and so does not derive 
purely from more modern writing on responsive regulation, but the 
similarities are obvious.46 The approach, known as “horizontal 
monitoring”, was adopted by the Dutch tax authorities in combination 
with risk rating when it appeared that a “command and control” and a 
“one size fits all” approach was failing, in particular with large 
multinationals.47 The system, based on voluntary individualized 
enforcement covenants, requires voluntary reporting in return for 
reduced auditing. The requirement to disclose goes beyond reporting 
actions involving “tax risks” and requires disclosure of the taxpayer’s 
views about the legal consequences of its actions and the positions 
taken by it. This has been criticized by Richard Happé as being too 
vague a requirement and he also points out that the entire system is 
based even more on trust than similar systems in other countries (such 
as Australia), where more due diligence verification takes place before 
an agreement is entered into by the authorities with a taxpayer than in 
the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Dutch horizontal monitoring system 
does require that the tax authority is satisfied with the company’s tax 
control framework and that the audit committee of the company is 
obliged to review the company’s tax strategy for tax planning.48 In 
return, the company not only has its administrative burdens reduced as 
a result of less auditing, but it is also able to obtain certainty upfront on 
some tax issues.49
                                                     
45  Named after the polders of land, which is land regained from the sea through the 
construction of embankments or dikes, requiring co-operation from all living on 
them to maintain them.  
 This underlines the importance of the two-way trust: 
the relationship works only if the taxpayer and tax authority both gain 
something. But this could raise questions if it were to involve the tax 
46  Richard Happé, “Multinationals, Enforcement Covenants, and Fair Share” [2007] 
Intertax 537, reprinted in Judith Freedman, ed, Beyond Boundaries: Developing 
Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk Management (Oxford: Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation, 2008) at 157. 
47  Ibid.  
48  Eelco van der Enden, Jos de Groot & Eric van der Stroom, “Netherlands” in 
Anuschka Bakker & Sander Kloosterhof, eds, Tax Risk Management: From Risk to 
Opportunity (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010).  
49  Ibid at 332.                                                                 
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authority making concessions, or resulted in withdrawal of the covenant 
because the company wanted to test the meaning of legislation by 
litigating it.  
Happé reports that the Dutch Ministry of Finance has suggested that 
taxpayers who have concluded a covenant and then are “caught doing 
something you should not, you will be dealt with more severely than in 
other situations”.50
B. “ENHANCED CO-OPERATION” BETWEEN LARGE BUSINESS AND 
THE REVENUE AUTHORITY IN THE U.K. 
 He comments that in such a situation the authority 
would be “expected to respond proportionately, within the boundaries 
of the law”, but he adds that what these words mean is unclear. The 
relationship created by enforcement covenants thus raises rule of law 
questions about clarity and equality of treatment of different taxpayers 
and the extent to which the covenant can reasonably be permitted to 
allow variations in such treatment by way or responsive regulation.  
We shall now turn to the U.K. for a further example of this type of 
relationship between the tax authority and large corporations, known in 
the U.K. as “enhanced co-operation”. It arose from a review of links 
with large businesses, known as the Varney Review,51
                                                     
50  Happé, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 168.  
 which aimed at 
creating a relationship based on trust and understanding between large 
corporate taxpayers and HMRC. HMRC put forward proposals 
designed to achieve four desired outcomes: greater certainty, an 
efficient risk based approach to dealing with tax matters, speedy 
resolution of issues, and clarity through effective consultation and 
51  See HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), 2006 Review of Links with Large Business 
(London: HMRC, 2006) [HMRC, Review of Links]; HMRC, Making a Difference: 
Delivering the Review of Links with Large Business (HMRC, March 2007); HMRC, 
Approach to Compliance Risk Management for Large Business (London: HMRC, 
2007) [HMRC, Approach]; HMRC, The framework for a better relationship: 
Making a Difference: Review of Links with Large Business (London: HMRC, 
2008). See also Judith Freedman, Geoffrey Loomer & John Vella, “Corporate Tax 
Risk and Tax Avoidance: New Approaches” [2009] British Tax Review 74 
[Freedman, Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”] (for a detailed discussion of the 
U.K. tax approach; note that the 2007 guidance on tax compliance risk management 
discussed in that paper was revised in 2009, and has now been revised further as 
described in this article. This revision meets some of the criticisms made in that 
article).  
dialogue. The proposals, which all sought to contribute towards the 
enhanced relationship, included the introduction of a system of advance 
rulings for businesses in certain circumstances, a new approach to 
transfer pricing enquiries, a process for the quick and efficient 
resolution of issues, a new consultation framework, improved guidance, 
and the introduction of a risk rating system, intended to give a “more 
cost effective use of resources and efficient resolution of issues”.52
C. THE RISK RATING PROCESS 
 
The risk rating process is premised on the basis of voluntary 
compliance from low-risk rated companies, allowing resources to be 
focused on those who present higher risks. There is considerable 
reliance on the taxpayer’s own systems and governance in deciding the 
risk assessment.53 The process used to decide on risk status is described 
in HMRC’s on-line Tax Compliance Risk Management Manual 
(TCRM).54 The TCRM is written for HMRC’s own staff but doubles as 
a document giving guidance to taxpayers. Each large company dealt 
with by the Large Business Service (LBS) of HMRC and some smaller 
companies also are awarded a risk rating.55
                                                     
52  HMRC, Review of Links, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 6, 16.  
 This may be low risk or 
non-low risk and the risk level determines the volume of HMRC’s 
interventions in the company’s affairs and the nature of the working 
relationship between the two. In essence, a light touch is adopted for 
low-risk companies, thus releasing resources that can be directed 
towards higher risk companies. For taxpayers who are rated as low risk 
there is not normally another Business Risk Review for three years. For 
others the risk rating is revisited annually and there are also other more 
53  HMRC, Approach, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 3.11; 
Braithwaite, “Large Business”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
54  HMRC, Index Tax Compliance Risk Management Process (TCRM)—Main 
Contents, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> [HMRC, TCRM]. 
55  See HMRC, Large Business Service, online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk>; HMRC, 
Large Businesses serviced by Local Compliance—delivering a new relationship, 
online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> (this approach was initially adopted by the 
Large Business Service for the 770 largest companies in the U.K. but was then 
rolled out to some smaller businesses falling within HMRC’s Local Compliance 
(Large & Complex) teams (LCLC) and now the principles are filtering through to 
smaller businesses). 
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frequent interventions.56
Risk is based on a number of factors, including level of complexity 
of the business and its relationships with others, pace of change, 
governance, openness and co-operation, ability to deliver the “right” tax 
through systems processes and skills, tax strategy and finally 
“contribution”, that is whether the amount of tax declared looks 
“reasonable.”
 The idea is that taxpayers will be keen to have 
fewer interventions by being classified as low risk and HMRC may 
make savings by examining primarily the systems of those companies 
rather than every detail and by making fewer interventions because they 
trust the figures coming from the taxpayer. The HMRC risk rating is 
confidential and not required to be disclosed in published accounts.  
57
On the whole and even given the uncertainties, anecdotal and survey 
evidence suggests that business has found the approach helpful.
 It can be seen from this brief description that many 
judgments are involved in this assessment. Who decides what is the 
“right” or reasonable amount of tax, how are tax systems to be judged 
and what kind of tax strategy is acceptable? HMRC’s view of this is 
given in the TCRM, which was revised in April 2011 to make some 
clarifications, as discussed below. 
58 
Problems that have emerged have to some extent been recognized in the 
revision of the TCRM issued in April 2011. The minutes of the 
Business Tax Forum (BTF), a group of tax directors from major 
companies that meets with high ranking HMRC officials on a regular 
basis, reveal several of these issues.59
                                                     
56  HMRC, TCRM, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at TCRM1000. 
 Not surprisingly, these are similar 
57  Ibid at TCRM3310. 
58  Freedman, Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.; Sally Malam et al, Large Business Customer Survey: Full Report, August 
2010: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Research Report 102 (London: HMRC, 
2010), online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk>; IFF Research, Large Business Panel 
Survey: Businesses’ Experience of HMRC: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
Research Report 142 (London: HMRC, 2011), online: <http://www.hmrc.gov.uk> 
(the 2011 report largely confirms the findings of the 2010 report).   
59  See HM Revenue & Customs, Business Tax Forum, online <http://www 
.hmrc.gov.uk> (for minutes of these meetings and membership of the BTF) 
[HMRC, BTF]. 
to survey comments based on interviews with a group of company 
representatives undertaken by the author and colleagues.60
D. CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGERS 
 
One area that has concerned business is the degree to which having a 
customer relationship manager (CRM) can assist to increase 
transparency and save time. For large businesses which have them, 
CRMs who get to know the business and work closely with it, have 
proved to be beneficial in many cases, always subject to the quality of 
the individual CRM. 61 In particular, a CRM assists with transparency 
of decision making, though once technical specialists get involved this 
seems to decrease again.62
Re-enforcing the value businesses find in dealing with CRMs, the 
BTF minutes note that transparency of decision making remains a 
problem and question why and when specialists are sometimes involved 
rather than leaving matters to the CRM.
 This suggests that investment in 
understanding the business of customers and spending time talking with 
them pays off, as would be expected from the work on responsive 
regulation.  
63
This shows the difficult balance between the encouragement of trust 
and voluntary compliance through good relationships with revenue 
officials and the maintenance and application of consistent standards 
across all taxpayers. If all matters were to be left to CRMs, it can be 
imagined that policy coherence and horizontal equity between 
taxpayers could be lost. On the other hand the relationship of trust will 
work only if the officials have sufficient authority. This is a general 
problem with the management of the exercise of discretion. Moreover 
the CRM relationship with business has the potential to open up 
 In some areas, notably 
transfer pricing, specialists are called in to deal with issues arising and 
some businesses feel that the advantages of having a CRM are diluted.  
                                                     
60  Freedman, Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
61  Malam et al, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Freedman, Loomer & 
Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
62  Supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
63  HMRC, BTF, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 20 July 2010; IFF 
Research, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 3.26. 
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questions about over-familiarity and this problem needs to be guarded 
against by moving CRMs around fairly frequently, but not so frequently 
that they cannot get to know the business they are working with.  
E. CRITERIA FOR RISK RATING: TAX PLANNING 
One example of the concerns with the enhanced relationship was that 
there was initially a view that very large and complex businesses could 
never receive a low risk rating. This seemed to remove an incentive to 
amend behaviour to achieve a low risk rating, since it was thought that 
was impossible anyway in the case of many of the companies 
targeted.64
while factors such as the size and complexity of a business create their 
own risks and can make it more challenging for customers to comply 
with their tax obligations, even the largest and most complex 
businesses can be classified as Low Risk if they mitigate these risks to 
an acceptable level through their behaviours.
 There would be a problem with placing taxpayers on a linear 
risk rating system when in fact the material factors are far more varied 
than this suggests. The guidelines now attempt to make plain that  
65
It is stressed in the revised TCRM that this is not purely theoretical. 
There are already a number of highly complex large businesses which 
have been identified as low risk.
 
66
The BTF minutes for July 20, 2010 noted that there was a feeling 
that HMRC had made it more difficult to become low risk and that 
there was some ambiguity over what was considered to be “tax 
planning”. This is the problem that lies at the heart of how to decide 
whether a corporate taxpayer is “compliant” or within the grey area 
described above and, as discussed there, taxpayers and HMRC may 
 Attaining this classification, 
however, requires not only transparency and adequate governance 
systems but also consideration of the approach of the taxpayer to tax 
planning. Whilst the TCRM is clearly intended to clarify the position, 
this leaves a considerable amount of discretion with the CRM and 
HMRC generally.  
                                                     
64  Freedman, Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”, supra noteError! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
65  HMRC, TCRM, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at TCRM3100. 
66  Ibid at TCRM3310. 
take different views of the position. The new TCRM is intended to 
clarify this also. One of the seven factors that will be assessed in 
assessing risk is tax strategy, which is described as “the customer’s 
involvement in tax planning which does not support genuine 
commercial activity”.67
This is further explained at TCRM3330.
  
68
The difficulty with these guidelines is that they rely on criteria 
which are not to be found in the U.K. statutes or case law. There is 
currently no statutory GAAR in the U.K.,
 To be sure to be low risk a 
customer must not structure transactions in a way which “gives a tax 
result contrary to the intentions of Parliament” and must tell HMRC 
about “transactions involving innovative interpretation of tax law and 
fully disclose any legal uncertainty”. Occasional engagement in tax 
planning that contravenes these guidelines might be tolerated provided 
there is full disclosure but failure to inform HMRC about this activity 
as well as more regular engagement in such activity both increase the 
chance of being found not to be low risk. 
69 nor a judicial anti-
avoidance doctrine which explicitly bases validity upon “genuine 
commercial activity”.70 It is arguable that this might be a desirable 
requirement, but it is not one under current law. The current position in 
the U.K. is that there is no judicial doctrine that applies to tax avoidance 
but that the courts must apply purposive interpretation as in other 
areas.71
                                                     
67  Ibid. 
 The courts must ask “whether the relevant statutory provisions, 
68  Ibid. 
69  See HM Treasury, News Release, 04/11, “Details of Avoidance Study Group set 
out” (14 January 2011) (the question of whether the U.K. should adopt a GAAR is 
currently under discussion and the author is a member of a study group set up under 
the leadership of Graham Aaronson QC to advice ministers on this issue; the study 
group is due to report in October 2011). 
70  See Financial Markets Law Committee (FMLC), Issue 146—Proposed HMRC 
Code: Response to the June 2009 HM Revenue & Customs Consultation Document 
on a Code of Practice for Banks (London: FMLC, 2009), online: <http://www 
.fmlc.org> (comments on a proposed code of practice on taxation for banks).  
71  BMBF, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. especially para 33. 
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construed purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, 
viewed realistically."72
BMBF and subsequent cases have reiterated that this does not 
amount to an overriding power to strike down transactions that have no 
commercial purpose.
 
73
 The test of commerciality expressed in the TCRM can be, therefore, 
only a rule of thumb that is applied by HMRC. Many tax directors of 
large companies would agree that this was a fairly useful guide to the 
type of activity that will ultimately be upheld by the courts
 It is not entirely certain how far the courts 
believe that viewing the facts realistically can take them but the House 
of Lords was clear that it would be going too far to say that transactions 
or elements of transactions which had no commercial purpose should 
always be disregarded. It is all a question of the interpretation of the 
relevant statute.  
74 but it is 
not the actual test that is to be applied as a matter of law. Furthermore, 
the advisers and directors of the taxpayer might have a different 
interpretation from HMRC of the meaning of the statutory provision, 
including what is included as “commercial”, even taking into account 
the need to construe statutes purposively and in line with the “intention 
of the legislature”.75
                                                     
72  Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd [2003] HK CFA 46, para 35, 
cited in ibid. 
 Nevertheless, it follows from the description of the 
factors relevant to risk rating in the TCRM that taxpayers disagreeing 
with HMRC interpretations too often will find it difficult to obtain or 
maintain a low risk rating. Potentially, this places good deal of power in 
the hands of HMRC in asserting their interpretation of the legislation. 
The taxpayer can of course still appeal to the courts and argue against 
HMRC’s view of the tax liability based on the interpretation of 
particular legislation, but it might lose its low risk rating, which HMRC 
seeks to argue is a valuable status to have as it results in lower 
73  Ibid at para 36; HMRC v Mayes, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 
74. 
74  See Freedman, Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined. at 111 (where tax directors interviewed referred to commerciality as a 
guide). 
75  See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
administrative costs and burdens.76 If low risk status is desirable, and 
many large companies seem to agree it is, although others query the 
benefits,77
It is significant that the BTF minutes for November 2010 stated that 
HMRC confirmed that a taxpayer cannot be low risk if it participates in 
avoidance schemes. Business representatives responded that there were 
still areas of confusion regarding tax planning and some thought that 
the benefit of being transparent was diluted by this complication. It 
would appear that they felt that they should be able to interpret the law 
in a way that seemed reasonable to them provided they disclosed this, 
rather than being given a higher risk rating purely because they took a 
different view from that of HMRC.
 then this is a potential rule of law concern, as the taxpayer 
has no mechanism for appealing the risk rating, since this is purely an 
administrative tool.  
78
                                                     
76  HMRC, Review of Links, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at ss 1.11–
1.15. See also HMRC, BTF, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1 
November 2010, s 5; (HMRC claims as a further benefit of being low risk that they 
would trust the business to raise any tax issues so that the low-risk business can set 
the agenda).  
 So it seems that whilst some 
businesses do value low risk ratings and other advances resulting from 
enhanced co-operation, such as real time working, and may even be 
prepared to modify their behaviour to gain these perceived benefits, 
others are not certain that the benefits of a low risk rating outweigh the 
resulting loss of freedom to engage in tax arrangements that HMRC 
dislikes, but which the business considers to be reasonable tax planning. 
The question then is whether if the objective is primarily to increase 
resource allocation, risks could not be achieved simply through 
77  As explained above, the consequences relate to the frequency of interventions by 
HMRC and thus the cost and burden of administration. In an HMRC survey two 
thirds of companies responding indicated that they took their risk status into 
account when structuring their tax affairs (IFF Research, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined.). On the other hand, in interviews some directors have 
suggested that the benefits of a low risk rating are not always clear: Freedman, 
Loomer & Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; 
HMRC, BTF, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1 November 2010. See 
also IFF Research, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1.24 (“In the 
follow-up interviews some businesses did, however, indicate that they felt that the 
benefits of being low risk could be clearer and that it was important that low risk 
meant less scrutiny and that it provided cost and time savings”).  
78  HMRC, BTF, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1 November 2010.  
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transparency rather than also expecting businesses to refrain from 
certain types of tax planning.  
Whilst the revised TCRM issued in April 2011 did not deal 
conclusively with all the issues raised in the BTF meetings and in 
surveys, it did clearly seek to respond to some of the concerns. The 
experiment of enhanced co-operation with business is generally 
considered to be a successful one.79 The modifications and 
improvements may be considered to be a good example of the helpful 
outcome of a valuable regulatory conversation.80 Even this interaction 
can raise some concerns, however, since there is sometimes a 
perception that the largest businesses with access to CRMs and the 
ability to enjoy a close relationship with HMRC may obtain benefits 
not available to other, smaller taxpayers. If the advantages of an 
enhanced relationship are as claimed then it follows that those to whom 
such a relationship is not available are not being treated as 
advantageously as the larger firms. This is supported by HMRC’s own 
survey material which shows that businesses without a CRM were less 
satisfied with the service provided by HMRC than were those with a 
CRM.81
IV. APPLYING THE THEORY TO PRACTICE  
 
A. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MIXED OBJECTIVE PROBLEMS.  
In the examples of a new approach to tax compliance outlined in Part 
III, there are suggestions of both the rule of law problem and the mixed 
objectives problems referred to at the end of Part II.  
In his Fasken lecture, John Braithwaite states that lawyers need to be 
weaned off the obsession with regulation being only about rule 
compliance.82
                                                     
79  IFF Research, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 Insistence on a literal interpretation of detailed rules is 
clearly unhelpful in the tax area as in any other. Many, including this 
author, have argued that tax legislation should be based on principles so 
80  Malam et al, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Freedman, Loomer & 
Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
81  IFF Research, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 1.3–1.9. 
82  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
that creative compliance and game-playing are discouraged.83 As 
discussed above, however, there are areas of genuine uncertainty in the 
tax arena and appeals to morality will not resolve these uncertainties. 
Not only is there not always an obvious morally right answer to the 
question of how much tax should be paid, but taxpayers will argue, 
reasonably, that their liability to pay tax is about the duty imposed on 
them by law, so that only the law can answer that question.84 Taxes are 
not voluntary contributions and therefore there must be a question mark 
over the extent to which sums not clearly required to be paid by law 
should be coaxed out of taxpayers by persuasion.85
Braithwaite himself acknowledges that “routine regulatory 
encounters taking the high moral ground tend to be 
counterproductive.”
  
86 If that is the case then proper consideration has to 
be given to the actual legal position rather than some vague and 
unenforceable notion of the “spirit of the law”, if that is read as going 
beyond the law as it would be applied by the courts. 87
So we can see the possibility, as discussed in Part III above, that if 
large corporate taxpayers consider that HMRC’s view on the 
acceptability of tax planning is too far away from their own and that 
 If the only 
purpose of relying on the spirit of the law is to impose payment of more 
than the law would require, or even to avoid the trouble and expense of 
having to investigate what the law would require in fact, this does seem 
to be a potential rule of law problem.  
                                                     
83  Braithwaite, “Dancing”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Freedman, 
“Anti-Avoidance”, supra note 26; Freedman, “Improving”, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
84  See ibid. 
85  Indeed company directors must also consider their fiduciary duty to the members of 
the company as a whole, which will often be to enhance shareholder value through 
maximizing profits, although not at all costs. For example in U.K. company law 
arguably it has always been acceptable to take into account potential reputational 
damage and this is now stated explicitly in s 172 (1) of the Companies Act 2006. 
For a history and critique of the section and the surrounding discussion, see Andrew 
R Keay “Working Paper: Centre for Business Law and Practice: The Duty to 
Promote the Success of the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose?” [unpublished, archived 
online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssrn.com>]. 
86  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
87  See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined., Error! Bookmark not 
defined.and accompanying text. 
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which the courts will take in due course, they may consider that a low 
risk rating is too high a price to pay for having limits imposed on them 
beyond the legal limits. Further, if taxpayers were to continue to be 
unclear about the benefits of transparency because interpretations they 
felt were reasonable were being challenged, then, although the risk 
rating might continue to have resource allocation benefits by virtue of 
focusing HMRC on activities it considered to be high risk, it would not 
work well as a method of encouraging compliant behaviour. This is an 
example of the “mixed objectives” problem. Taxpayers might feel that 
since they were high risk anyway they might as well be even more 
aggressive in their tax planning strategy.  
It can be seen, therefore, that it is important both in terms of going 
no further than the law permits and in more pragmatic terms of 
obtaining trust and co-operation, for HMRC to keep closely to the law 
as it would be interpreted by the courts if risk rating is to achieve its 
objectives. Whilst the law is too uncertain to make this a precise 
exercise, the criteria used should be those taken from legislation and 
case law. Awareness of this need is shown by the BTF discussions, 
although the fact that business has raised this as an issue shows that it is 
an area that has to be closely watched and a careful balance found. 
Similarly, the outcome of discussions on the Code of Practice on 
Taxation for Banks in the U.K. in 200988 showed that critics believe 
that references to requiring banks to comply with the “spirit of the law” 
and to the requirement that banks should not engage in tax planning 
other than that which “supports genuine commercial activity” go too far 
to the extent that they require behaviour going beyond that which is 
required by law. The Financial Markets Law Committee criticized the 
proposed Code for seeking “to introduce, through non-statutory means 
and for one section of the tax paying community only, an obligation to 
comply with what is presumably regarded as a more exacting standard 
of behaviour than is currently provided for in legislation.”89
We agree that HMRC should not become responsible for legal 
interpretation. Banks will continue to be taxed in accordance with the 
law. The Code is not law, but a statement of principles which provide a 
 HMRC 
responded,  
                                                     
88  FMLC, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
89  Ibid at 6.1.  
benchmark for corporate behaviour in relation to governance, tax 
planning and the relationship with HMRC.90
Nevertheless, the Code continues to use language that could be seen 
as requiring the banks to go beyond their legal obligations. Moreover, 
HMRC’s reiteration of the genuine commercial activity test in the April 
2011 TCRM revision shows that they still think use of this benchmark 
is acceptable, despite the fact that it continues to be rejected by the 
courts.
 
91 Many banks have signed up to the Code92
More generally, the combination of the Code and pressure from non-
governmental organizations, protest groups and the media, which has 
been growing in recent months in the U.K. and elsewhere,
 and corporate 
taxpayers have not seen fit to object too openly to these tests being set 
out in non-statutory contexts. It remains to be seen whether any of this 
has the effect of modifying taxpayer behaviour in the long run or 
whether it merely affects presentation.  
93
                                                     
90  Ibid at response on question 1. 
 may have 
some effect due to the concerns of business about reputation, although 
how significant this will prove to be for the companies involved in the 
long run remains to be seen. To the extent that decisions which could 
91  Supra note 68. 
92  Not wholly surprisingly given the economic situation and the weak position of the 
banks, including the fact that the U.K. government has a stake in some of them. See 
HMT Budget 2011, para. 1.91: “Two hundred banks have now adopted the Code, 
including the top 15 banks operating in the U.K.”. This appears to have been the 
result of a certain degree of governmental pressure, see “UK banks given tax deal 
deadline”, BBC News: Business (17 October 2010), online: <http://www 
.bbc.co.uk>. 
93  See UK Uncut, UK Unkut, online: <http://www.ukuncut.org.uk>. The organization 
has arranged several protests against the perceived avoidance of tax by large 
corporations or their owners. More established charities such as Christian Aid and 
Action Aid have also run campaigns against tax avoidance, mostly focusing on 
problems of international taxation depriving developing countries of tax revenue: 
see Act!onAid, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. On reputational effect 
and tax and corporate social responsibility more generally see Freedman, Loomer & 
Vella, “New Approaches”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Prem Sikka, 
“Smoke and Mirrors: Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance” (2010) 34 
Accounting Forum 153; Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Summer 
Conference: July 11: Taxing Corporations: Competitiveness, Transparency and 
Responsibility, online: <http://www.sbs 
.ox.ac.uk> (presentations and videos available for download). 
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impose costs on corporate taxpayers are taken on the basis of 
interpretations that go beyond the law, the points made by the Financial 
Markets Law Committee seem to remain a matter for concern. It has 
been reported, for example, that banks are beginning to require 
additional checks before lending to partnerships because of concerns 
about tax planning.94 This may have some good effects if it means they 
are less likely to fund aggressive pre-packaged tax avoidance schemes 
which have little chance of being upheld by the courts in the long run, 
but is less helpful if it is adding additional costs to loans to commercial 
structures. There is clearly a balance to be achieved: if pressed too far 
the policy behind the Code of pushing the question of tax strategy into 
the Board room and beyond strict legal rules could be counter-
productive,95 but if a firm view of legal responsibilities is kept in sight 
it may be a useful tool to prevent companies concerned about their 
reputation from taking positions that are unlikely to succeed if litigated. 
Of course some corporate taxpayers will continue to be bullish about 
their right to minimize their taxes regardless of these reputational 
issues. For those the remedy will be escalation up the pyramid to 
enforcement through the courts if necessary, but it would be wrong if 
those companies not concerned about reputation were required to 
behave only in accordance with the law, whilst more compliant 
companies were required to go beyond the law. Far better to change the 
law if it cannot prevent unacceptable behaviour as it stands.96
Some would argue that this analysis places too great an emphasis on 
the construction of the legislation by the courts. They might say that 
there needs to be confidence in the fairness of the tax system and 
perhaps more account should be taken of the views of the public, of 
non-governmental organizations and others with an interest in tax 
administration when determining the amount of tax that each taxpayer 
should pay as well as of the administrators who must operate the 
system. Picciotto has argued that “the issue of indeterminacy and 
 
                                                     
94  Jamie Kaffash, “Firms suffer from banks’ fear of avoidance” Accountancy Age (4 
May 2011). 
95  For example, directors might complain of tax uncertainty or even threaten to move 
business outside the U.K. 
96  Freedman, “Anti-Avoidance”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (arguing 
for a statutory general anti-avoidance provision for this purpose).  
formalism is fundamentally about democracy, since it concerns the 
processes for generating the authoritative meaning of laws.”97
A wider and indeed more democratic, legitimacy [than can be obtained 
from relying simply on the authority of lawyers as technical specialists] 
comes from adopting a more open epistemology, which acknowledges 
that legal rules have a wider social resonance and impact, and that their 
understanding must be informed by wider social practices, especially 
those of the persons to whom they are addressed. 
 He goes 
on to comment that  
If this is intended to suggest that there should be wide consultation 
in formulating tax policy and drafting tax legislation, going beyond the 
legal experts, then this would command wide acceptance, but it does 
not support the interpretation of tax legislation in a way that would not 
be upheld by the institutions intended to give effect to enacted 
legislation following a process established by the elected 
representatives of a democratic society. In other words the legal 
provisions should reflect social norms and give full effect to them as far 
as possible, but this should be fed into the process prior to and not post 
enactment. This might require better ways of discussing tax legislation 
before it is enacted as well as better methods of drafting. But it is not a 
reason to elevate some concept of “the spirit of the law” above the law 
as it will be understood by the courts at the interpretation stage. To do 
that would be fundamentally undemocratic and open to abuse by 
pressure groups and lobbyists as well as undermining the legal system 
and ultimately potentially putting the revenue authorities in a very 
difficult position in which they were being pressured one way or the 
other.98
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98  See e.g. the current debate in the U.K. over the settlement by HMRC with Vodafone 
plc. UK Uncut argued that Vodafone was “let off” a £6 billion tax bill. This figure 
has been described by HMRC as “absurd”. The case was settled for £1.25 billion, 
which HMRC considered was reasonable and which it was within their authority to 
agree as a matter of management of the revenue collection system. Nevertheless 
both HMRC and Vodafone were widely and vehemently criticized by the media and 
by UK Uncut, sometimes with very little understanding of the true position.. This 
shows the dangers of moving to public opinion as a test of the amount of tax to be 
paid rather than the law. See UK Uncut, Major victory: NAO to investigate HMRC's 
dodgy deal (25 January 2011), online: <http://www.ukuncut.org.uk> ; Duncan 
Robinson, "Protesters target Vodafone over taxes", Financial Times (27 October 
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So, insisting on compliance with some concept of the “spirit of the 
law “ that goes beyond legal compliance seems to pose rule of law 
problems, as defined above, in the sense of government needing to 
govern by known rules In order to satisfy this requirement it may be, 
however, that precision is not essential. There can be some room for 
discretion without breaching the requirements of the rule of law. Philip 
Pettit (an important influence on John Braithwaite),99 for example, 
argues that the best sort of law may have to leave some discretion in the 
hands of governments agents, but measures are then needed to ensure 
that those agents cannot act on a wholly arbitrary basis.100
If this discretion is guided by principles embodied in the law itself, it 
may be that the discretion given is no greater than under a system of 
detailed rules. Detailed and prescriptive legislation in the U.K. does not 
appear to have removed the need for extensive extra-statutory guidance. 
In addition, these detailed rules they often give rise to game playing and 
even absurdities because of unintended conflicts and errors. In such a 
situation courts may be required to contort language to come to a 
sensible solution or they may refuse to do that as being beyond their 
remit and so the matter has to go back to the legislature to deal with by 
  
                                                                                                                
2010); U.K. Parliament, Treasury Committee, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral 
Evidence: to be published as HC 731-ii (16 March 2011), online: 
<http://www.publications 
.parliament.uk>. The National Audit Office has now examined the power of HMRC 
to reach such settlements, although not the specific case, and has made 
recommendations for improving HMRC’s governance in this area: National Audit 
Office, HM Revenue & Customs 2010–11 Accounts, Report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (July 2011). This is not a purely U.K. phenomenon: in the U.S. the 
New York Times has recently attacked GE, see David Kocieniewski, “At G.E. on 
Tax Day, Billions of Reasons to Smile”, New York Times (25 March  2011) A1; for a 
response from GE, see GE Reports, GE and Taxes (28 March 2011), online: 
<http://www.gereports.com>. 
99  See John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of 
Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
100  Pettit, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 174–175. On the need for 
mechanisms to control revenue discretion under the existing U.K. system, see 
Judith Freedman & John Vella, “HMRC’S Management of the UK Tax System: the 
Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion” in Christopher Evans, Judith Freedman & 
Richard Krever, eds, The Delicate Balance: Tax Discretion and the Rule of Law 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2011).  
yet further complex legislation. Such problems seem less rather than 
more likely to arise in legislation based on principles. 101
Thus a plea for matters to be governed by legislation is not a plea for 
a return to literal interpretation of detailed rules but for a statutory 
framework capable of sensible application in controlling discretion. 
This comes down to drafting good legislation that governs any 
necessary areas of discretion through principles that can be overseen by 
the courts, rather than leaving matters entirely to extra-statutory 
regulation that cannot be supervised in this way. In this way the spirit of 
the law and the legislation can become close to the same thing and there 
is no need for revenue authorities to persuade taxpayers to comply in a 
way that goes beyond the law.  
  
Not only can responsive regulation in the large business context 
raise questions about interpretation of the law, but to an extent it gives 
the authorities discretion as to when and how to apply the law. It 
suggests that enforcement should be based not purely on the severity of 
any non-compliance but also on the willingness to comply with the 
regulator. Potentially this could result in the revenue authority applying 
its powers in an arbitrary way depending on its relationship with a 
taxpayer rather than by reference to a scale set out by way of a legal 
framework. Critics such as Yueng102
Most tax systems recognize the need for the tax authority to have 
some discretion not to enforce tax law in every case if, for example, it 
would be inefficient to do so, and the U.K. is no exception.
 argue that this may not result in a 
fair and proportionate response.  
103 The 
question is how this discretion should be controlled and not be 
permitted to become a power for the revenue authority to make tax law. 
This would be unacceptable to taxpayers as a whole and therefore 
counter-productive. In the context of the example in Part II of the 
relationship with large business, this shows the importance of clear 
published guidance on risk rating and on the actions HMRC will take in 
any given situation.104
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mechanism, perhaps to an administrative organization rather than a 
court, if there is disagreement over the way the relationship is 
managed,. This may be a more difficult issue than interpretation, given 
that ultimately interpretation issues can always be taken to the courts 
but complaints about the operation of the management discretion may 
have no formal procedure available, although there may be 
administrative procedures in existence for this purpose.105
B. RISK RATING AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
 
As described in Part III above, taxpayers may be risk rated and treated 
differently depending on where they fall on the risk scale. In some ways 
this is entirely consistent with responsive regulation. There is an 
assessment of the taxpayer’s willingness to comply. A compliant 
taxpayer is rated as being low risk and therefore not to be subjected to a 
high level of audit, since that taxpayer is trusted to self-regulate, to 
some extent. Initially this sits well with the pyramid of compliance, but 
it could become static, non-responsive and backward looking if not 
regularly reviewed and this would then be far from responsive. It could 
also lead to under-deterrence of low level risk activity, which might be 
inefficient in the long run.106
[t]he pyramid is not about specifying in advance what are the types of 
matters that should be dealt with at the base of the pyramid, which are 
the more serious ones that should be in the middle and which are the 
most egregious ones for the peak of the pyramid. Even with the most 
serious matters . . . we stick with the presumption that it is better to 
start with a dialogue at the base of the pyramid.
 This might also reduce confidence in the 
fairness of the administration of the tax system, to the ultimate 
detriment of compliance by the majority. In his Fasken lecture, John 
Braithwaite explains that  
107
                                                                                                                
taxpayer, for example in the context of settlements with large business it is 
important that HMRC has a published Settlements Strategy and can show it has 
followed its own procedure); National Audit Office, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined..  
 
105  Evans, Freedman & Krever supra note 101.  
106  See Black, “Emergence”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 512; 
Baldwin & Black, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 66. 
107  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
This does give rule of law problems with proportionality and 
fairness between taxpayers, as touched upon above. However, provided 
taxpayers are being open and transparent about transactions which they 
believe are within the statute but where there may be some uncertainty, 
it would suggest that the starting point should continue to be a low-risk 
relationship. This should be so even if HMRC takes the view that there 
might be tax avoidance which the courts would strike down or which is 
not in accordance with HMRC’s view of the intention of Parliament.  
Too rapid an escalation up the pyramid might jeopardize the 
responsiveness of the risk-rating system and this analysis does seem 
consistent with some of the comments in the BTF minutes.108
Some anecdotal comments on the risk-rating of large companies also 
chime with comments made by Baldwin and Black that risk-based 
frameworks may focus resources in high risk areas at the expense of 
lower risk areas. In time, unless supplemented by other programs, this 
could lead to under-deterrence of low-level risk activity and “substitute 
widely spread risks for lower numbers of larger risks.”
  
109 In the context 
of the example discussed in Part III, once rated as low risk, companies 
might feel they can get away with more “innovative interpretations” for 
a period of three years until the next business risk review is due.110
The exchanges around risk rating of large business in the U.K. for 
tax purposes underline the potential difficulties with using responsive 
regulation combined with risk rating in this area. At the same time they 
also bear out the value of regulatory conversations as a mechanism for 
controlling this process and working towards a good balance.
 No 
doubt this is a possibility of which CRMs will be well aware and in any 
event it would only work once. 
111
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of the TCRM as shown in Part II above, although some potentially 
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Code. It seems likely that the conversation will need to be an on-going 
process and that the tension between the different objectives of risk-
rating will need to be kept in mind.  
It is not only the relationship between HMRC and the taxpayers in 
question that need to be taken into account in this process. A regulatory 
conversation that is seen as becoming too restricted to the parties 
themselves and too “friendly” will not help tax compliance more 
generally and will open up business and the tax authority to criticism, 
as described above.112
The question posed was “Isn’t this contrary to HMRC’s 
responsibility to collect the right amount of tax from the largest 
taxpayers in the UK?” The answer given: 
 In its own TCRM available on-line until the April 
revision, HMRC apparently felt they should address concerns about the 
treatment of low risk taxpayers in the frequently asked questions 
section of the TCRM (which, it should be remembered, is largely 
addressing the concerns of its own staff). 
No. We expect Low Risk customers to have extensive tax compliance 
procedures and processes, well qualified staff or advisers, a relatively 
conservative strategy towards tax filing and mitigation positions, be 
committed to open disclosure of potential risks and adopt a 
collaborative approach to resolving them. 
We need to deploy our best technical skills fully where this kind of 
relationship does not exist and experience has shown that the amount of 
tax recovered by compliance interventions across this customer group 
represents a very small proportion of LBS compliance yield. The 
resource we and our customers would otherwise spend on such 
compliance interventions is better spent improving compliance 
elsewhere.113
This is a sensible defence of the resource allocation mechanism 
being used, but the very fact that the question is being asked suggests 
that concerns about equity as between taxpayers have been raised. 
Thus, where risk rating is used as a device to save administrative costs 
and prevent the need for regular audits there is a danger that, whilst it 
may be very efficient, it is a tool that needs to be handled with care. 
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Treating taxpayers differently depending on their profile enables tax 
authorities to use their limited resources efficiently but also has the 
potential to result in unfair treatment for one taxpayer in relation to 
others. The line between good management and an unfair or 
disproportionate use of this tool is a thin one. As pointed out by 
Baldwin and Black, the criteria used may not be purely technical but in 
fact may be contentious. Although apparently an administrative device, 
this could hide important policy issues and make scrutiny and 
accountability in relation to those issues difficult.114
V. CONCLUSION 
 There could be 
tension between efficiency and constitutional values unless the 
discretion available to revenue authorities is used with great care. 
The discussion in this article of the application of responsive regulation 
and risk-rating to a particular area of tax administration, large business 
compliance, shows that John Braithwaite’s ideas have great value in tax 
administration provided they are handled with care and not pushed too 
far. Care has to be taken, however, not to extend expectations of 
taxpayers beyond legal requirements.  
If there is a perception that taxpayers are being required to go 
beyond the law in their compliance, the approach could become 
counter-productive. In addition, the motivation of responsive regulation 
needs to be clear. If the aim is to encourage transparency and self-
regulation, it may be better and clearer to focus on that without also 
trying to prevent taxpayers from adopting arguable interpretations of 
the law with which the revenue authorities disagree. This might get in 
the way of encouraging more important types of co-operation, such as 
full real time disclosure. Contentious legal issues could be left to legal 
decision, rather than risk rating. Subject to this, a co-operative and 
trusting environment can be efficient and positive in its results for all 
concerned. 
This is not an argument for the literal application of rigid, detailed 
legislative rules; far from it. Instead it is argued that good legislation 
based on principles would amount to an improved method of conveying 
and ascertaining parliamentary intention in the tax arena and would 
provide a better framework for controlling the proper use of discretion 
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by revenue authorities. Combined with responsive regulation, 
sensitively applied, and good supporting mechanisms for scrutinizing 
and controlling discretion, this would lead to a sensible and workable 
basic framework for managing the inevitable uncertainties of taxation in 
a complex world. Further assistance can be provided by having 
extensive consultation and other regulatory conversations, but these 
conversations must include all groups and not only parties involved in 
particular areas if they are to inspire confidence in the public. It is not, 
however, for the public or the media or, for that matter, the revenue 
authority to decide how much tax is payable, but for the legislature, 
having been informed by public debate and in the terms it has 
communicated to the courts. Once legislation is in place that should be 
enforced equally in relation to all taxpayers but it is reasonable for audit 
and enforcement resources to be allocated based on risk within that 
framework. Juggling all these factors will require constant vigilance but 
if the balls can all be held in the air at once this could give an outcome 
which would be at least satisfactory. In the complex world of large 
corporate taxation, this would be a good result.  
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